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I.

Background

At the International Seminar on Systems for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
organized by UNCTAD and the Government of India, held in New Delhi in April 2002,
participants considered inter alia how evolving national systems for the protection of traditional
knowledge could be supported or augmented by international measures adopted at the regional or
global level.1 Countries supportive of traditional knowledge protection may enact provisions
designed to prevent misappropriation of traditional knowledge, but such action will not be
effective beyond those countries’ borders unless an international system is put in place. For
example, even if country A amends its patent law to enable denial of a patent to be based upon
the anticipation of the claimed invention by available local (oral) traditional knowledge, those
provisions will not prevent the privatization of that knowledge by the grant of patents in Country
B unless (i) Country B has similar provisions protecting traditional knowledge, and/or (b)
Country B is aware of, and recognizes, the traditional knowledge claim made by the local
community in Country A.
Thus, if the objectives of proponents of traditional knowledge protection, including those
stated in the Convention on Biological Diversity, are to be realized international initiatives are
essential. The need for solutions on the international level has been discussed in a number of
fora. Yet, the effective protection of the holders of traditional knowledge requires that these
discussions move in some way toward implementation of working systems of protection.
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It is likely that any initial step toward such implementation will not, in itself, accord
holders of traditional knowledge the levels (or perhaps types) of protection that they would
regard as ideal. But putting in place a framework or structure for translating national forms of
protection into an international system on an ongoing basis would reassure holders of traditional
knowledge that incremental progress is worth pursuing, enabling agreement to be reached on
basic issues while discussion continues on contested matters. Such a framework, even if based
initially on minimal substantive levels of protection, would allow initial standards to be
augmented or developed in a fashion that parallels, replicates and perhaps balances, the system
for the protection of forms of intellectual property currently recognized at the international level.
Moreover, if the discussions that have been taking place are to reach fruition in the near
future, it might be helpful to develop a system that bears structural resemblance to the system of
international intellectual property law dear to the hearts of many developed countries. This is
not, of course, to preclude advocates of traditional knowledge protection from considering a
system that is wholly new, nor to feel captive to traditional notions of property rights. Rather, in
advocating a particular structure of protection for traditional knowledge, it will be useful to know
to what extent proponents must articulate the need for a completely new paradigm, or whether
instead they can point to historical antecedents in the intellectual property system already favored
by otherwise recalcitrant countries. Indeed, this comparative analysis might also suggest models
that are more or less likely to be acceptable. Finally, this comparison is important because many
of the proposals to protect traditional knowledge necessarily affect the intellectual property
system, which otherwise might privatize the resources with respect to which traditional
knowledge rightholders wish to assert claims.
II.

Scope of this Paper

This paper explores options for the possible reciprocal recognition, through an
international treaty, of sui generis regimes for the protection of traditional knowledge adopted at
the national level. It thus focuses on framework, or structural, issues, rather than on the
substantive elements of sui generis systems for the protection of traditional knowledge. But the
two questions cannot wholly be divorced. That is, the framework of any international system
will depend in part upon the substantive forms of protection that are accorded. Likewise, the
forms of protection that are adopted might reflect the international framework chosen. Thus,
although the paper focuses on structural issues, I have noted points where the substantive
protections accorded might affect the international framework chosen,2 and thus where interested
parties developing substantive norms might wish to have particular regard to questions of
structural implementation.
It is of course important, especially given the prominence of the debate in the TRIPS
Council regarding the interpretation and possible revision of TRIPS (whether Article 27(3)(b) or
2
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Article 29), that the TRIPS compatibility of any proposals be considered. The TRIPScompatibility of the principal proposal considered in this paper has already been exhaustively and
comprehensively considered by other scholars of international intellectual property law,3 and
various governments have advanced positions on that topic in the context of ongoing TRIPS
debates. In this paper, I will not repeat that analysis, other than summarily where relevant to my
suggestions.4 Instead, I will focus on the different components of any international structure that
countries might wish to pursue.
As noted above, the following commentary draws in large part (for the several reasons
mentioned and with the caveats outlined above) on models found in international intellectual
property law. The primary models from which I have drawn inspiration in this paper are models
of trademark law and the law of geographical indications. Yet, the principal proposal that I will
analyze most directly affects patent rights. (Traditional knowledge protection obviously must
also affect the future development of national trademark law; but the proposal discussed below is
in large part aimed at the inappropriate privatization that occurs through the patent system). This
is a conscious decision. The proposal that is analyzed below is essentially an attempt to derogate
from the principle of territoriality that pervades and is at the root of, international intellectual
property law. That principle is most resolutely advocated and enforced in the patent context. In
contrast, international trademark (and geographical indications) law – while firmly based upon
the same general principle – has in several respects developed exceptions to that principle. These
exceptions might provide the source for a range of options that countries might consider as the
model for a system of traditional knowledge protection that likewise moves away from the
principle of territoriality. Moreover, an historical analysis of where resistance to such
developments has been most acute in the field of trademark and geographical indications might
provide guidance to those seeking to construct an approach to traditional knowledge that
encounters less resistance.
III.

A Preliminary Word about Diversity of Models
and Arguments of Premature Internationalization

The principal challenge facing the development of an international system for the
protection of traditional knowledge is that, even in those countries that protect traditional
knowledge, similar results are achieved through a wide variety of devices. These devices are
each thought appropriately to further the same general goals consistent with the different life
patterns (and different types of traditional knowledge) in different communities around the
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world.5 The challenge therefore is to construct an international system where there is little
consensus on the perfect system, but general agreement (among countries advocating protection)
on the overall goal.
This diversity of approach at the national level is often cited by opponents of traditional
knowledge protection as one reason why the development of an international system is
premature. In most cases, the international system codifies norms that are generally agreed-upon
at the national level, at least among developed countries. Yet, it is not unheard of that
international intellectual property norms are articulated before there is consensus on the national
level. The most recent example is the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 6 where provisions addressing
anti-circumvention of technological protection measures were adopted before many countries had
given any thought to the issue at the national level.7
Moreover, the existence of disparate approaches, fueled by similar fundamental
sentiments, really goes to the form of the international system. If principled compromise or
reconciliation of the different national approaches were possible and/or desirable, then efforts
might best be directed at the articulation of detailed harmonized standards for protection. But if,
instead, the goal is to allow different countries to adhere to their local approaches, the articulation
of substantive norms is likely to occur at a very general level with an admonition that each
member state had latitude as to the means by which it implemented its obligations. Again, this
approach is consistent with the existing international intellectual property system. Article 1(1) of
TRIPS recognizes this general principle, and where a particular difference over means of likely
implementation was discernable in advance during the negotiations, drafters of TRIPS made
specific reference to the options.8
Indeed, the choice between detailed international standards and an international system
with generally-stated minimum standards (backed up by general obligations such as national
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See Protecting Traditional Knowledge – The International Dimension, Paper Submitted
by the Department of Commerce, Government of India, (New Delhi, April 2002) at 4 (“Each
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7

See id. art 11.

8

See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81,
93 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], art. 23(1), n.4.
4

treatment) was precisely the choice that faced the drafters of the Berne Convention.9 They chose
the latter. Thus, if the goal of countries negotiating traditional knowledge protection is to design
a system that accommodates a myriad of ways of reaching the same goal, the development of
leading components of the international intellectual property system stands in historical support
of (rather than in opposition to) such efforts.
IV.

A Specific Proposal to Consider: Some Structural Choices to Debate

At the New Delhi meeting and elsewhere, the Indian Government made a specific
proposal that national patent laws should, as a matter of international law, be required to contain
the following provision:
(1)

patent applicants must disclose the source of knowledge and biological material,
and

(2)

give an undertaking that the “prevalent laws and practices of the country of origin
have been fully respected.”10

This is the proposal that is the focus of the discussion in this paper; its implementation
would require the construction of an international framework for the protection of traditional
knowledge.11 But the observations herein made concerning the Indian government proposal
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See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987).
10

See Protecting Traditional Knowledge – The International Dimension, Paper Submitted
by the Department of Commerce, Government of India ¶ 22 (New Delhi, April 2002).
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A fuller analysis of all aspects of an international system for the protection of traditional
knowledge would address a fuller range of issues, all of which would be necessary to ensure the
broadest possible protection. Most importantly, mechanisms granting protection can take two
forms, though the emphasis between one or the other may depend in large part upon the favored
rationale for traditional knowledge protection. One mechanism for protecting traditional
knowledge might be intended to prevent privatization of the resources, by limiting or
conditioning the ability of one person to obtain intellectual property rights in the biological
resource or associated traditional knowledge. The other mechanism involves the affirmative
grant of property rights in traditional knowledge to the appropriate groups of rightholders, for
exploitation by them in accordance with local (or legally defined, but locally-influenced) norms.
This bifurcation mimics very closely the rights that attach to geographical indications. Thus, in a
fuller system of protection, essential components might include international agreements: (1)
mandating affirmative protection for traditional knowledge in national law; (2) mandating that
national systems allow the curtailment of intellectual property rights that conflict with traditional
knowledge rights; (3) establishing informational mechanisms to provide notice of claims, both to
5

should also be of broader application.
The first part of the Indian government proposal (the disclosure obligation) has
importance in and of itself, separate and apart from the country-of-origin compliance undertaking
(and the effect given thereto). Importantly, it would provide information that enabled ongoing
assessment to be made of whether countries are complying with their obligations under Article
8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD):
(i)
(ii)

to ensure that the wider application of traditional knowledge occur with the
“approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge”;
to “encourage the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of”
traditional knowledge.

Requiring the disclosure of the country of origin of genetic resources and related
traditional knowledge in patent applications would also incidentally assist in identifying and
demarcating traditional knowledge. One of the substantive critiques often leveled at proposals
for the protection of traditional knowledge is the inability to identify knowledge in which rights
are claimed.12
The disclosure part of this proposal is already the subject of discussion in a number of
fora. It implicates at least two questions. First, does the TRIPS Agreement or any other
international agreement (such as the Patent Law Treaty) set ceilings on the type of requirements
or conditions to which a patent application can be subjected? This is simply a matter for
interpretation of existing international obligations. As noted above, this question has already
been addressed by scholars of international intellectual property law13 and is the subject of

facilitate limitations on intellectual property rights and to facilitate determinations of ownership
and benefit-sharing with respect to traditional knowledge; and (4) constructing a system for
recognizing and enforcing determinations regarding traditional knowledge made in so-called
“countries of origin.” The need for this last component depends in large part upon the extent to
which the first and second components are achieved.
12

Additional informational components, also aimed at furthering the notice component
that is thought important in a number of intellectual property regimes, might includes registers of
asserted claims of traditional knowledge (regardless of whether related to the subject of a filed
patent application). If the argument is to be made to developed countries that patentees not be
entitled to obtain patents because of prior traditional knowledge, that argument will be stronger if
the patentees are on constructive notice of the claims of traditional knowledge right-holders.
That is to say, if a claim is asserted on a register to which patentees have access, the patentees
can be deemed to have been aware of such claims, rendering claims of inequity less persuasive.
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contested views among nations in the TRIPS Council.14 Without repeating that analysis in detail,
the debate would likely center on whether the principle of nondiscrimination in Article 27 of
TRIPS applied across-the-board to all aspects of patent law (including disclosure requirements)15
and whether Article 29, which sets out disclosure requirements that must and may be imposed
upon a patent applicant implicitly precludes any other disclosure requirements from being
imposed.16
Ordinarily, most international industrial property agreements set limits to the types of
conditions that may be imposed rather than articulating affirmative disclosure or other
obligations that must be imposed on applicants for rights. Thus, the Indian proposal can
conceptually be aligned with broader efforts to create substantive maxima17 as well as substantive
minima in international intellectual property treaties. That is, procedural treaties such as the
Trademark Law Treaty and the Patent Law Treaty (or the non-formalities provision of the Berne
Convention)18 are in large part driven by the same philosophy that drives treaties imposing
substantive minima obligations; they guarantee rights to the rights-applicant, whether
substantively or in terms of the maximum procedures to which their application may be
subjected. Phrased as such, the argument has substantial academic appeal, but has had little
resonance in the policymaking arena to date.
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See submissions cited in Ho, supra note 3.
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See Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and
The Preservation of The Public Domain of Science Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER O F TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME (Maskus and Reichman eds. 2004) (Cambridge Univ. Press) (forthcoming);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and
the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT ’L ECON. L. 431 (2004).
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In this debate, the meaning of Article 62 of TRIPS might also be of relevance.
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See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Industrial Design
Protection in the European Union, 24 AM . INTELL . PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 611, 715 n. 274 (1996)
(coining the term “substantive maxima”); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Institutions of
International Intellectual Property Law: New Actors, New Sources and New Structures, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 98TH ANNUA L MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY O F INTERNATIONAL
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Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV . 21
(2004), but in this context the rights are not truly accorded users. Like such conceptions,
however, they are mandatory restraints on national intellectual property rights.
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See Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971 Paris
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A second question is whether, if such a disclosure obligation is permitted (or could, if
necessary, be imposed by national law under an amendment to TRIPS),19 could such an
obligation be imposed on WTO members, requiring amendment of their patent laws? This
would require a new international instrument creating such an obligation. The contours of such
an obligation, though resisted by developed countries in the ongoing debate in the TRIPS
Council, are not complicated, even though the political dynamic may be far from simple.
The second part of the proposal is what gives the proposal broad international scope. It
would provide even greater effect to nationally-recognized traditional knowledge rights. But it
would also likely be more controversial, because it implicitly dictates the consequences in the
patent laws of Country A of determinations made in accordance with the traditional knowledge
protection laws of Country B. (It is implicit because the proposal did not expressly provide the
consequences of a false declaration; presumably, it would invalidate the patent.)20 That is the
principal focus of the rest of this paper.
An initial objection to this approach is that it is inconsistent with the principle of
territoriality which underlies the international intellectual property system. That is, countries
may defer (upon treaty accession, or treaty implementation) to international norms by adopting
them as national law, but that does not involve deferring to foreign law or determinations of
foreign institutions. Deference to foreign law would be implicated simply by requiring patentgranting countries to determine whether the “the prevalent [traditional knowledge] laws and
practices of the country of origin have been fully respected.” The prospect of deference to
foreign institutions is raised if national courts or patent agencies are required to give effect to
decisions of courts or agencies in the country of origin determining (non-)compliance with the
traditional knowledge laws of that country.
Either approach would be an exception to the rigid principle of territoriality that pervades
international intellectual property law. As choice-of-law rules mature in intellectual property
law, it may become increasingly common for national courts to apply foreign law to certain
issues in multinational litigation.21 But, even with such developments, the application of foreign
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A comprehensive set of reforms would also effect amendments to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty and perhaps the European Patent Convention. Such proposals have in fact
been floated, but those are not central to this paper.
20

To be fully effective, of course, this would also have to be accompanied by the
enactment of traditional knowledge protection laws in nations seeking to further the protection of
traditional knowledge.
21

See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d
Cir. 1998) (ownership of copyright).
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law to determine the existence of a domestic intellectual property right is unlikely.22 Indeed,
patent law is perhaps the least likely candidate for such radical reform. And deference to
decisions of foreign institutions also implicates questions of efficiency and judicial competence
that currently bedevil negotiations regarding a broad-based international convention on
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in intellectual property matters.
It has to be stressed, however, that the territoriality objection is not insurmountable. Even
the extant intellectual property treaties contain exceptions to the strict principle of territoriality
(though rarely in patent law).23 For example, although Article 6 of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property affirms the principle of independence of trademark rights in
different countries,24 Article 6quinquies (A)(1) provides that “every trademark duly registered in
the country of origin shall be accepted for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the
Union, subject to the reservations indicated in this Article.”25 As a result of this so-called “telle
quelle” principle,26 domestic applicants may be denied trademark registration by virtue of a prior
conflicting registration (whose sole basis for registration is an analogous foreign registration).27
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See The Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421(S.D.N.Y. 1998),
aff’d on reconsideration, 36 F.Supp.2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (copyright originality standard).
23

Patent law does contain (in the Paris Convention, the Patent Law Treaty, and the Patent
Cooperation Treaty) procedural devices at the international level designed to facilitate the
acquisition of national rights on a multinational basis.
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See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6(1) (“The conditions
for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be determined in each country of the Union by
its domestic legislation.”); id. art 6(3) (“A mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be
regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the
country of origin.”)
25

In the United States, this principle is reflected in Section 44(e) of the Lanham Act,
which provides a basis for trademark registration in the United States without use in the United
States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(3). The Madrid system for the international registration of marks,
to which the United States has recently acceded, likewise raises this possibility.
26

The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in its only report on trademark
law to date, has offered a relatively narrow reading of Article 6quinquies. See United
States–Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS176/AB/R (WTO 2002). National legislatures and courts have implemented the principle
in more generous fashion. See, e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. 909 (T.T.A.B. en banc 1984).
27

See, e.g., Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q.
909 (T.T.A.B. en banc 1984).
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Likewise, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides that:
“The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or
at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to
prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or
a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and
used for identical or similar goods.”
Both these provisions might be seen as derogations from the principle of territoriality of
trademark rights, thus supporting the general approach that the Indian government proposal
would like to pursue.28 And these two provisions have received global national implementation,
suggesting that it would not be unprecedented for member states of the WTO to deny the grant of
industrial property rights in their own country based upon the recognition of rights accorded by a
foreign nation.
These exceptions (telle quelle, and the protection of well-known marks) are, however,
themselves subject to carve-outs that enable the recognizing state to exercise some control over
the rights recognized under its national laws. Thus, the telle quelle principle of Article
6quinquies is subject to Article 6quinquies(1)(B), which enables recognizing states to refuse to
recognize the foreign right in certain defined circumstances.29 Likewise, the protection of wellknown marks mandated by Article 6bis of the Paris Convention allows national courts to exercise
sovereignty by virtue of the subset of foreign marks to which it extends these protections. Not all
marks are well-known, and determinations of which marks are well-known in the recognizing
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These provisions can be conceptualized in other ways (e.g., as a choice of law rule, or as
partial harmonization of substantive protection for unregistered marks). But viewing the
provisions in these alternative ways does not undermine the central point here.
29

See Paris Convention art. 6quinquies(1)(B) (“Trademarks covered by this Article may
be neither denied registration nor invalidated except in the following cases
1. when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the
country where protection is claimed;
2. when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively of signs or
indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or have become
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the
trade of the country where protection is claimed;
3. when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a nature as
to deceive the public. It is understood that a mark may not be considered contrary to
public order for the sole reason that it does not conform to a provision of the legislation
on marks, except if such provision itself relates to public order.”)
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state will be made by the courts or administrative agency of the recognizing state.30
Indeed, where treaty drafters have made efforts to go further (such as in some treaties
dealing with geographical indications) and have recognizing countries defer entirely to foreign
rights or foreign determinations, some countries have been resistant to accession. For example,
one of the reasons for opposition in the United States and elsewhere to the Lisbon Agreement for
the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration was that member
countries would have been required to accept determinations of protectability under the law of
the country of origin without any exceptions (such as whether the term was generic in the
recognizing country).31 The ongoing debate in the TRIPS Council regarding the effect of a
geographic term being included on the proposed multilateral register of geographical indications
illustrates that this resistance is still strong. Indeed, in TRIPS Council discussions, the United
States (and others) have objected to hard legal consequences flowing from inclusion on such a
register even when there would be an ability on the part of third countries to object to a term’s
inclusion.
Drafters of a proposal along the lines suggested by the Indian government might make
their proposal more attractive by:
*
*

including exceptions (such as those to which the telle quelle principle is subjected); or
conditioning the types of traditional knowledge that would receive extra-territorial
protection (as in the case of well known marks).

Both of these structural concessions might ameliorate in the minds of opposing countries
the derogation from territoriality (often cast as an intrusion on sovereignty) that is seen as
unsettling. Each would, however, require drafters to enter into discussion about substantive
principles of protection; as noted above, there are some points at which the structural questions
will inevitably be intertwined with substantive issues. To give examples that parallel the
exceptions to Article 6quinquies or the conditions of Article 6bis, negotiators could consider
whether:
*
*

there are particular determinations (e.g., oral prior art) on which recognizing nations
would specially wish to retain sovereignty?; and
there are certain types of traditional knowledge that protecting states would most wish to
give enhanced (i.e., additional automatic international) protection?

30

Suggestions to create an international registry of well-known marks has never received
substantial support. Cf. Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registration System for Famous
Trademarks, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1097 (2003) (discussing famous marks registry).
31

See Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in The TRIPS
Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11 (1996).
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These questions are of course essentially political matters, driven not simply by where
harmonization of legal concepts seems possible but also by where political priorities are most
acute. Thus, to reach such agreements, some concessions would likely be required. But it should
be remembered that concessions in the framing of mandatory international obligations need not
derogate from the ability of nation-states to implement more far-reaching protection of traditional
knowledge at the national level. But that is a battle that must be fought at the first stage of the
Indian proposal, namely in securing an interpretation or amendment of TRIPS that permits the
imposition of such additional disclosure requirements in national law.32 If that flexibility is
secured, then any international agreement, even with exceptions or conditions, might be regarded
as progress by those seeking the protection of traditional knowledge.
V.

Further Amendments to the Proposal?

At least three other approaches might be considered, all of which are efforts to mitigate
concerns that might be expressed by countries reluctant to allow their patent laws to be subject to
foreign laws and/or institutions. The first approach would replace foreign laws with
international laws; the second approach would replace foreign decision-making institutions with
international decision-making institutions; and, finally, one might seek to implement the proposal
by casting it as a “public private international law” solution grounded in “applicable law”
concepts. Each approach presents problems that would have to be addressed.
(1)
International norms. If recognizing countries are hesitant to apply foreign norms
in allocating property rights under their national laws (i.e., requiring compliance with the local
laws of the country of origin of the biological material), then the application of an international
norm may seem less of an intrusion upon sovereignty. Thus, for example, although national
traditional knowledge law might articulate a broad notion of traditional knowledge protection
and be subject to continuing modification or enhancement by national authorities, the
international rule might articulate a narrower and more settled set of rights making the
recognizing countries less vulnerable to changes in the traditional knowledge law of foreign
countries into whose lawmaking processes they would have no input.
Courts and administrative panels already apply international norms in the trademark
context in at least two senses. First, in applying a basic norm applicable in all national systems,
courts may infuse the content of that norm with international meaning. An example of this is
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention. Article 10bis provides that “the countries of the Union are
bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective protection against unfair competition”
and further notes that “any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.”
Although in most states this international obligation is specifically implemented in
national law by a provision prohibiting unfair competition (and thus any actions are strictly
32

See supra text accompanying notes13-16.
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brought under the national statutory provision) the meaning of what amounts to unfair
competition might on occasion be supplied by international norms. Thus, the leading authority
on the Paris Convention has suggested that:
what is to be understood by “competition” will be determined in
each country according to its own concepts but that whether an act
is contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters
is not limited to honest practices existing in the country where
protection against unfair competition is sought but should also take
into account “honest practices established in international trade.33
To be sure, the application of this commitment to international norms is far from
consistent. But the structure is in place. Article 10bis has been invoked by courts as disparate as
the High Court of Beijing (in a cybersquatting case) and the federal district court for the Eastern
District of Michigan (in a trade secret case).34 If this model were pursued, of course, the central
issue for delegates to debate would be the substantive norms that national courts would apply (or,
if drafters were more willing to adopt a flexible standard, to where would national courts look for
the ascertainment of those international norms).
A second (related) sense of the application of international norms would be where the
legal standard itself is set out in detail at the international level (as opposed to Article 10bis,
where the standard is initially implemented and determined under national law, though shaped by
international practices). In this category, one might place the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (the “UDRP”). This is also an example of using an international institution,
and I discuss it in that context immediately below.
To state these comments more concretely, the Indian proposal might instead require that
patent applicants certify that they have complied with the rules regarding biological resources set
out in an international agreement.35 Some developing countries might fear that, given the
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G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN , GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR
PROTECTION OF INDUST RIAL PROPERTY 142-46 (1968). Similarly, the notes that accompany
WIPO’s Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition argue for account to be
taken of conceptions of honest practices in international trade, rather than solely the country
where the conduct occurs. See MODEL PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR
COMPETITION , Notes 1.03, 1.04 (WIPO 1996).
THE
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See General Motors v. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996); China IP Express,
No. 24 (June 22, 2000) (Rouse & Co. Int’l) (discussing IKEA case before Beijing court).
35

There would be several sub-issues that would be generated by any of these approaches.
For example, would identification of a group of persons as the owners of traditional knowledge
on a multilateral register automatically give them standing to contest any grant of rights in the
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consensual nature of international treaty negotiation, substantive international standards would
likely be very easy to satisfy. To assuage those concerns, it might be possible for individual
states to mandate compliance with stricter traditional knowledge standards for the purposes of
applications under that country’s national laws. The capacity of member states to require
compliance with higher standards for domestic applications would no doubt be part of any
negotiated compromise.36 The argument for such flexibility might stress an analogous structure
in current international intellectual property treaties. Thus, WTO member states are presently
entitled to offer intellectual property protection in excess of international minimum levels.
Under this proposal, members could impose traditional knowledge compliance obligations in
excess of the international minimum.
(2)
International Institutions. Once rights in Country A are made dependent upon
compliance with legal rules of Country B, a jurisdictional question arises: which institution is to
determine the question of compliance with the law of country B? The most obvious parallel
would be the methods used by courts directed, either by a contractual choice of law clause or its
own internal choice-of-law rules, to apply a foreign lex causae. Ordinarily, determinations under
that foreign law are made by the forum, giving the forum courts some latitude to interpret foreign
law narrowly or broadly. Alternatively, the forum could refer the question of foreign law to the
courts of the lex causae; reference procedures are sometimes used, for example, by U.S. federal
courts sitting in diversity proceedings and thus applying the law of the State in which they sit.
The tradition of exclusive jurisdiction in the patent-issuing state in patent litigation
suggests that forum courts would likely retain decision-making powers in the circumstances
presented by the Indian government proposal. However, judicial competence or expertise –
another rationale often invoked in support of exclusive jurisdiction – might counsel in favor of
input from courts in countries with developed bodies of traditional knowledge law. And the
question may become even more complicated (and contested) if the courts in Country B have
previously rendered decisions regarding whether the patent applicant in Country A has complied
with the traditional knowledge laws in country B. What weight should the courts in Country A
afford such decisions? Given the history of the Hague Convention negotiations, it is likely that
developed countries will resist any substantial deference to foreign institutions.37
If certain countries are hesitant to allow the allocation of their domestic patents rights to

recognizing state? Or perhaps only nation states, or a specially created agency such as a National
Biodiversity Authority, would have standing to object?
36

To enable such an approach, member states would also require to resolve the TRIPS
interpretation questions noted above.
37

See Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Work. Doc. No. 110E (Revised) (27 April 2004), at
www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_wd110_e.pdf.
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be affected by determinations of foreign administrative agencies regarding compliance with
traditional knowledge rules, one might consider using an international institution to make
compliance determinations.38 Such an approach might seem attractive especially given the
success of the UDRP in addressing the claims of trademark owners against cybersquatters. For
example, an international institution could be authorized to make determinations regarding
traditional knowledge claims that would then be used for the purposes of the international
recognition system.39
Although determinations of non-compliance would be binding on countries and thus a bar
to patent grants on a multinational basis, a system could be constructed that would allow member
states to make their own determinations of compliance for domestic purposes (where the
international institution makes an affirmative determination of compliance with country of origin
law). An argument to allow member states to retain this domestic capacity would be strongest if
the role of international institutions was limited to detecting clear cases of non-compliance,40 or
if the international institution made its determinations according to a relatively liberal
international norm. But it is likely that developed countries would take the position that
compliance determinations be equally as binding as determinations of non-compliance. That is,
the ability to offer broader protection to traditional knowledge under national law might be part
of a political compromise with developed countries.
The UDRP contains many features that night caution against its use as a model here, of
which only three are highlighted here. First, ICANN’s ability to regulate the domain name
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This option could be pursued whether compliance is to be measured against country of
origin laws or international norms. Expertise arguments are perhaps strongest where
international norms are involved, but an international institution would still be capable of
interpreting national (country of origin) law. In administrative proceedings under the UDRP,
international panelists frequently are obliged to make determinations (e.g., regarding the
existence of trademark rights) under national law.
39

For the purposes of the bare text advanced by the Indian government, the only relevant
question is compliance with local (country of origin) law. But ancillary questions will inevitably
arise. For example, if standing to object to a patent grant is based on ownership of traditional
knowledge, see supra note 35, determinations of ownership will become crucial. It is possible
that certain questions such as ownership be reserved to courts of the country of origin, while
compliance be treated as a matter for the international institution. Ownership of existing
intellectual property rights is often analytically separate from the existence or scope of rights.
See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998).
As a matter of international trademark law, national ownership rules are largely unregulated. See
United States–Section 211, supra note 26.
40

A finding for the respondent under the UDRP does not preclude the trademark owner
from bringing a complaint under national laws (which may afford greater rights).
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system and impose the UDRP on the vast majority of cybersquatting disputants is achieved
through the powerful (and sometimes despised) cocktail of contract and technology. Such a mix
is not present here. Such an apparatus for traditional knowledge would have to be established by
international agreement. Second, national authorities have only been willing to defer to the
injection of UDRP panel jurisprudence because UDRP determinations are soft law, which can be
overturned by the application of local national law without regard to international standards. In
large part, national over-rides have not occurred (with some exceptions, mostly in the United
States). But that is in part is because of the relatively impecunious nature of the persons
(individual domain name registrants) whose rights are defeated by the international system. If
the soft law nature of the UDRP were followed, patent applicants would be likely to exploit any
softness in the model by pursuing actions under “hard” national law. Finally, the expertise
required to make determinations under traditional knowledge regimes, and the development of
the evidence necessary evidence to make those determinations, may best be found in local courts
of the country of origin. The issues addressed in UDRP proceedings are typically more routine.
These comments are not intended to discourage discussion of whether using an
international institution might overcome some of the concerns of transfer of sovereignty to a
foreign nation. Rather, if such an approach is to be adopted, these structural components of how
to mandate international jurisdiction, the relationship between national and international
decisions, and the development of the appropriate expertise and evidence, would require
attention.
(3)

A Choice of Law Approach.

As suggested above, one might imply view the Indian government proposal as a choice of
law rule and cast it as such in negotiations. It certainly has the feel of such a rule: it suggests that
the prescriptive authority to regulate private ownership of genetic resources taken from a
particular country should normatively rest with that country. Viewing the proposal in those terms
might be an attractive theoretical approach,41 but would probably not be helpful for several
reasons of practical international politics. Most importantly, the development of international
agreement on choice of law in intellectual property matters is one of the few areas where
agreement is perhaps even less likely than with traditional knowledge.
VI.

Some other basic choices
41

For example, U.S. courts applying conflicts analysis have been willing to defer in
copyright matters at least to foreign law in determining ownership of copyrighted works
produced abroad where protection is sought against activity in the United States, although that
willingness would likely not extend to determinations of whether copyright protection existed.
See supra notes 21-22 (citing cases). In patent cases, however, the applicable law would surely
be regarded as the law of the patent-issuing state. See American Law Institute Project on
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes
(Prelim. Draft No. 2 Jan. 20, 2004).
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(1)

Soft or Hard systems

In developing an international system, interested parties must confront several choices
that arise in the construction of any international regime. Most prominently, those developing
the international system must choose how mandatory (or “hard”) to make the obligations of
participating parties. If the obligations imposed by the system are rigid, the protections accorded
by the system are made more real. Yet, that very effectiveness may make countries that are not
fully convinced of the merits of the protection of traditional knowledge to balk, thus initially
reducing the reach of the system. On the other hand, creating a system that is so “soft” that its
obligations are voluntary might expand the reach of the system at the expense of its effectiveness.
A related dynamic (though not in conventional terms a question of hard or soft law)42 can
be seen in the early stages of the development of the international intellectual property system.
Both the leading intellectual property conventions of the last century, the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, initially expanded only by incremental expansion of substantive obligations
largely consistent with norms upon which members had developed consensus through their
experience at the national level (and without real enforcement). As a result, membership in these
conventions imposed minimal obligations and membership grew readily.
Yet, it was impatience with that inclusive process (as reflected in the activities of the
World Intellectual Property Organization) that in part caused developed countries to seek to
expand intellectual property protection more speedily by shifting its discussion into a forum (the
revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that might impose obligations in
advance of a true consensus. Ordinarily, of course, making obligations more real – as happened
with the incorporation of the Berne and Paris Conventions in the TRIPS Agreement and
subsuming that agreement within the WTO dispute settlement system – might be expected to
disincentivize membership from reluctant nations. But the conclusion of TRIPS can be
explained on other grounds, including the pressure of trade and other considerations external to
the intellectual property obligations undertaken. More telling, perhaps, is the much slower pace
of negotiation of issues in the WTO post-TRIPS where those external social pressures do not
exist (or may in fact push in the other direction).
Although this dynamic is well-understood, it is very often discussed only in the context of
substantive levels of protection; more countries will agree more easily to lower mandated levels
of protection. Yet, the same dynamic operates with respect to structural issues; more countries
will agree to undertake obligations where they believe there is an accepted level of
noncompliance, or latitude, that they can exploit if national interests run counter to full
compliance. (This may explain, for example, some of the current debate in the TRIPS Council
42

The usual determination of whether a law is soft or hard pivots around the question of
bindingness. See Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of Soft Law, in COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE (Shelton ed. 2000).
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over the consequences to attach to the inclusion of a geographical indication on the proposed
multilateral register of such indications.43) Of course, countries generally take seriously even
non-binding obligations. And for good reason: reneging on international commitments, even
when compliance might not be compelled by others, is not cost-free; and non-binding
obligations, once articulated, often begin to pervade the arteries of the international system in
ways that render them far less discretionary in the long-term.
I introduce this basic choice simply to note that the choice of structures will not be
divorced from the broader geo-political considerations that might allow countries advancing the
protection of traditional knowledge to seek “softer” structures at some times, and “harder”
structures at others. In the current debates over the protection of traditional knowledge, this
variable is apparent, with various scholars contemplating voluntary guidelines for access sharing
and the implementation of benefit sharing arrangements.44
(2)

Within the Intellectual Property System?

A dilemma evident in much recent scholarship regarding traditional knowledge is
whether the protection of traditional knowledge should be pursued within the rubric of
intellectual property law. Amendments to existing intellectual property protection and the sui
generis protection of traditional knowledge are not mutually exclusive options. That is,
developing countries might still seek to vindicate traditional knowledge protection against broad
patent protection in the context of Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS, while developing a system for
affirmative traditional knowledge protection separate from the conventional intellectual property
regimes.
To some extent, the Doha Declaration already commits WTO members to attend to
traditional knowledge within that institution (and within the TRIPS Council in particular).45 But
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See supra text accompanying note 31.

44

One context in which the “hardness” of the international law might be relevant is the
weight given to inclusion on any register that might be created under alternative proposals.
Would the determinations of registering countries as to what is traditional knowledge, and who
owns or has rights in that traditional knowledge, be accepted fully (or fully subject to exceptions
sufficient to protect the sovereignty of the recognizing nation)? Or, alternatively, would the
drafters simply allow states to assert and state claims to traditional knowledge protection but
leave it to recognizing states to determine whether the holders of traditional knowledge have the
right under national law (of the second state) to preclude privatization of property by others or to
obtain protection for themselves?
45

See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶ 19 (instructing the TRIPS Council, in pursuing its work programme
including under the review of Article 27(3)(b) . . . and work foreseen by Article 12 [of the Doha
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addressing the matter fully within the WTO carries with it a full set of institutional and structural
commitments (e.g., national treatment for WTO members, the need for broad consensus, a
binding dispute settlement system) that might make it less easy to move toward a working
system.46 By the same token, advantages may attach to using the WTO’s institutional apparatus,
which would allow developing countries to bring actions for effective enforcement.
VII.

Bilateralism

Without wishing to be unduly defeatist given the global aspirations of interested parties, it
is appropriate to consider the role of bilateralism. At present, the developed countries are
deploying the bilateral mechanism in a wide range of international intellectual property
contexts.47 But the conceptual parallels to the struggle over protection for geographical
indications48 may suggest that it may be particularly appropriate to use bilateralism to advance
the objectives at the heart of the Indian government proposal. Bilateral agreements have been
crucial to the development of protection for geographical indications.

Declaration] to examine, inter alia, the relationship between [TRIPS, the CBD, and traditional
knowledge].”)
46

Indeed, this – like the inclusion of any substantive maxima with respect to intellectual
property protection – sets up a disincentive for developed countries to push for activism in the
WTO dispute settlement body in interpreting affirmative intellectual property obligations.
Although it is beyond the scope of this brief paper, developing countries should consider whether
they wish to characterize affirmative protection of traditional knowledge as “intellectual
property.” If the rights granted are within the intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPS
Agreement, they must as a rule (subject to few exceptions) be accorded on a national treatment
basis. Benefit sharing, for example, could be conceptualized as a rule regulating ownership or
scope of rights subject to TRIPS. Or could it be conceptualized as a right wholly unrelated to
those IP rights. As the EU has shown, both new forms of exclusive rights (sui generis database
rights) and rights to compensation (private copying levies and royalties) might be treated as
outside the confines of the TRIPS Agreement, though the EU’s arguments in this regard have not
been tested in the WTO dispute settlement system. Of course, if the rights accorded holders of
traditional knowledge are conceptualized as existing intellectual property rights, then other
substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement might also intrude. Thus, the Agreement sets
out the rights that a patentee or trademark holder or copyright owner must obtain and any
derogation from them (for the purpose of sharing the benefit with traditional knowledge holders)
must comply with the Agreement in terms of affirmative rights and limits thereon.
47

See Dinwoodie, The Institutions of International Intellectual Property Law, supra note

48

See supra text accompanying note 31.
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Although the Lisbon Agreement failed to establish a geographically broad system of
protection for geographical indications, several countries moved (and are still moving) toward a
broader network of protection through bilateral agreements structured around the same
derogation from territoriality exhibited by the Lisbon Agreement. Thus, under this approach,
during negotiation of the bilateral agreement, each country submits a list of protected
geographical names. Producers from each of these geographic regions obtain the exclusive right
to use the geographic indication in both countries. Thus, as under the Lisbon Agreement, the
country of origin controls the requirements for the legitimate use of certain geographical
indications at home and abroad. Although the objection to the Lisbon Agreement – that
recognizing courts would be bound by the laws or decisions of a foreign jurisdiction – also
applies here, this model has spread quite broadly in the area of geographical indications, an area
where multilateral agreement has been difficult to reach. If an impasse is reached likewise with
traditional knowledge, countries might consider the bilateral route in the interim as a step toward
multilateral solutions.
VIII.

Conclusion

As noted above, any comprehensive system for the protection of traditional knowledge
would in fact be comprised of several components. This brief paper has used the proposal of the
Indian Government as a launching pad to place before seminar participants in Geneva some
structural variables that might be useful to consider. Full consideration of these variables might
help develop a system that more easily accommodates differences of views on the topic.49

49

It might also (though this too is beyond the scope of the paper) effect intriguing
changes to the dynamics of the international intellectual property system (paradoxically by
articulating an approach with conceptual or structural parallels to the international intellectual
property system).
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